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Visions and Numbers: Aronofskys rr 




Rrhaps the revolutionary proposition of Lacanian psychoanaly-
sis involves the notion that analytic discovery does not involve a 
finding of meaning. In lieu of such a finding, the end of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis entails instead an encounter with something that sig-
nifies whose most salient feature is its stupidity-that is, its inability 
to be inscribed in any meaningful way within the order of under-
standing and knowledge. Lacan calls this thing that signifies a pure 
or primordial signifier, and he insists that both the efficacy of psy-
choanalytic treatment and our very conceptualization of the struc-
ture of subjectivity is bound up ineluctably with it. Admittedly, 
Lacan's advocacy of the primordial signifier cuts against the con-
temporary belief that freedom, pleasure, and radical politics depend 
on our liberation from such signifiers (and in many cases from 
subjectivity itselD. For Lacan, however, there is no getting beyond 
the primordial signifier, not when we recognize its structural ne-
cessity. Indeed, as Lacan sees it, the primordial signifier has sim-
ply a function-a formal gesture to carry out whose importance 
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lies not in the content of its signification, but rather in the fact that 
it is signifying. In a parable of sorts meant to illustrate this essen-
tial dimension of the signifier, Lacan says: 
I'm at sea, the captain of a small ship. I see things moving about 
in the night, in a way that gives me to think that there may be 
a sign there. How shall I react? If I'm not yet a human being, I 
shall react with all sorts of displays, as they say-modeled, 
motor, and emotional. I satisfy all the descriptions of psycholo-
gists, I understand something .. .. If on the other hand I am a 
human being, I write in my log book-At such and such a time, 
at such a degree of latitude and longitude, we noticed this and that. 
[1993, p. 188, Lacan's emphasis] 
This trivialization of just what a primordial signifier ends up 
moving a human being to write down-the message it brings re-
duced to a mere "this and that"-is part and parcel of a strategy to 
drain it of any and all meaning (thus meeting directly the charge 
that psychoanalysis belongs to the logocentric, and therefore du-
bious, history of reason and rationality) .1 Indeed, what distin-
guishes the primordial signifier for Lacan is precisely the extent to 
which it calls attention to its autoreferential, purely formal aspect. 
As Lacan puts it, 
What distinguishes the signifier is here. I make a note of the 
sign as such. It's the acknowledgement of a receipt (!'accuse de 
reception] that is essential to communication insofar as it is not 
1. This very notion of a pure signifier-of a signifier immune to perpetual 
partition-continues to mark the impasse between deconstruction and psycho-
analysis. In his most recent critique of the latter, Derrida again brings to bear on 
psychoanalysis "the question of divisibility," a question that renders impossible 
any putative claim to have unearthed a primordial signifier and thus reached a 
terminus of analysis: "Because dissociability is always possible (and with it the 
undoing of the social bond, dissociability) , because one must always and can 
always analyze, divide, differentiate further, because the philolytic principle of 
analysis is invincible, one cannot assemble anything whatsoever in its indivisi-
bility" (1998, p. 33) . 
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significant, but signifying. If you don't articulate this distinc-
tion clearly, you will keep falling back upon meanings that can 
only mask from you the original mainspring of the signifier 
insofar as it carries out its true function. [1993, p. 188] 
3 
Here, Lacan points to the radical and unsettling dimension of the 
primordial signifier: we know we are in its presence when we are 
forced simply to take note of a sign as such, when we choose to 
acknowledge receipt of a "message" that signifies wjthout being 
significant. 2 -
As Lacan's parable suggests, it is a primordial instance of sig-
nifying that enables a properly human world to emerge. This is why 
it makes sense to speak of the primordial signifier's function as 
essentially "creationist." As the first and purely formal instance of 
communication, it calls a human individual out of the animal world 
of automatic reactions and institutes a world in which objects and 
the natural environment achieve consistency and speech becomes 
possible. The psychoanalytic account of human and cultural de-
velopment lies here-in the notion that a sign acknowledged but 
not understood is the only way to account for the passage from nature 
2. The quintessential exemplar of such a message is, for Lacan, the statue 
of a smiling angel. According to Lacan, we need only visit a few cathedrals in 
order to see that an angel's smile is stupid-a sign that "it is up to its ears in the 
supreme signifier" (1998 , p. 20). For this reason, angels underscore the function 
of the signifier. As La can puts it, "It's not that I believe in angels ... it's just that 
I don't believe they bear the slightest message and it is in that respect that they 
are truly signifying" (pp. 20-21). This same point can be seen in Adorno's cham-
pioning of modernist art over and against social realism, his belief in the radical 
potential inherent in the autonomous work of art. Does not Adorno's aesthetic 
theory rest likewise on situating the work of art at the level at which its form 
alone isolates the primordial, alienating signifier oflate capitalist social relations-
that is, on the essential abandonment of a work of art dedicated to the commu-
nication of a message or lesson? As Adorno puts it, "The very idea, so fashion-
able nowadays, of 'stating something' is irrelevant to art" (1977, p . 168). Nor is 
"the office of art to spotlight alternatives" (p. 180). Instead, in Adorno's memo-
rable phrase, the work of art resists the course of the world (i.e. , the extant social 
order) by its form alone, rejecting in the process what Adorno called "the dog-
matic sclerosis of content" (p. 154). 
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to culture, from the animal world of instinct and appetite to the 
human world of language and desire. This sign acknowledged but 
not understood (i.e., the signifier) literally effects the subject-that 
is, it brings a subject about out of nothing. We are, as Lacan sug-
gests, "not yet a human being" when every signifier is understood 
to bear a meaningful and intelligible message. 3 Indeed, when ev-
ery desire is automatically and directly materialized, we cannot yet 
even be said to reside in the order of desire proper. But when one 
signifier exempts itself from the order of meaning, when the mes-
sage it brings eludes understanding, when we are forced to take 
note of its strictly formal function, then a fundamental division 
between self and Other can be said to have taken place, and a so-
cial order emerges in which we begin to speak and signify. Lacan's 
central thesis regarding the advent of subjectivity and the social 
order returns again and again to the key role played by the primor-
dial signifier in setting the subject adrift in a world of alterity, a 
world in which others appear to want something of us. When Lacan 
claims that "the signifier is what brings jouissance to a halt" (1998, 
p. 24), this is what he means: functioning as a sign that strikes the 
subject as a kind of address, the signifier interrupts the apparent 
(but in fact engulfing) idyll of presymbolic enjoyment, inaugurat-
ing a subject of desire and crystallizing an ontologically consistent 
social reality capable of being apprehended by human beings. 
The "this and that" whose observation is enabled by the pri-
mordial signifier, then, is perhaps the most sublime of all trivia; as 
3. One of the most interesting features of Steven Spielberg's AI. lies in its 
depiction of this idea. When David, the young "mecha" child (a mechanical 
being with artificial intelligence), is first introduced into a human family, heap-
pears as an inhuman presence, evincing a dispassionate coldness and inability to 
interact smoothly with his new mother and father. This coldness stems directly 
from his belief that every signifier bears a meaningful message, which is why the 
"directions" for adopting him involve confronting him with the stupid dimen-
sion of the signifier. His mother effects his humanization by reading a series of 
seven stupid, nonsensical signifiers. This encounter with the senseless signifier 
thrusts David into the realm of humanity, and he immediately hugs his "mother" 
and expresses his love for her. 
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the exception that interrupts the circuit of demand and satisfac-
tion, it ends up serving as the basis upon which human beings find 
their bearings in the world. We have here, of course, landed on 
the centrality of the Oedipus complex (i.e., the phallus qua primor-
dial signifier) in the development and socialization of human sexu-
ality. By introducing the signifier, the Oedipus complex enables 
the supersession of polymorphous sexuality by a hierarchization 
of the drives, thus conditioning a relationship between human 
beings and their sexed bodies that takes into account the larger 
norms and rules governing the display or practice of sexuality (in-
cluding, most crucially, the prohibition of incest). But the pure or 
primordial signifier emerges just as crucially in other forms-for 
instance, in the most primitive of cave paintings and mythological 
stories and in the highest natural laws unearthed by modern phys-
ics. Because both furnish signifiers without the slightest literal 
meaning, they provide the basic rules and laws that set us upright 
in the world, lending an organization and a structure and an order 
to human reality-or, as Lacan's encomium for Einstein's "little 
equations" would have it, "thanks to him we hold the world in the 
palm of our hand" (1993, p. 184). 
Lacan's claims regarding the stupidity of the signifier bear 
directly on what is arguably the dominant symptom of our histori-
cal moment-the psychotic structure (and threat of full-blown 
psychosis) currently animating a number of contemporary scien-
tific and mathematical efforts to "discover" that the primordial 
signifiers that stitch up a given universe of meaning do in fact carry 
a message of intelligible and meaningful content. Underwritten by 
the belief that these signifiers were never bereft of literal meaning 
in the first place, these efforts work at "incorporating the excep-
tion"-at certifying once and for all the tumescence of the signi-
fier. Examples of these efforts are numerous. There is, for example, 
the so-called Bible Code, in which events as disparate as Newton's 
discovery of gravity, the Stock Market's 1929 collapse, and Yitzhak 
Rabin's assassination are foretold by the God of the Old Testament. 
There is the Suzy Smith Project at the University of Arizona, in 
which subjects algorithmically encrypt a short phrase or sentence 
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that they'll then attempt to communicate to a living person after 
they die (thus confirming the survival of consciousness in the here-
after) . And finally, there is The Second Coming Project in Berkeley, 
California, which aims to locate an "incorrupt cell from one of the 
many Holy Relics of jesus' blood and body" for the purpose of fer-
tilizing a human egg with Christ's DNA and then implanting the 
zygote "into the womb of a young virginal woman (who has vol-
unteered of her own accord), who will then bring the baby jesus 
to term in a second Virgin Birth. "4 In all of these quests, we seem 
to be in the midst of concerted, psychotic attempts to show that 
our symbolic order has in fact been carrying the traces of its can-
onized status all along, that its ground is a sacred, extratemporal 
order of meaningful knowledge that has simply been awaiting the 
technological progress necessary for its discovery. 5 It is this order 
of knowledge, then, that stands ready to rebeatify our world and 
thus reverse the effects of that traumatic cut that marks the insti-
tution of the signifier-what Lacan, in the aforementioned parable, 
refers to as "things moving about in the night that gives me to think 
that there may be a sign there." 
The hidden but crucial mediator of these efforts is the criti-
cal, said-to-be "objective" or "ideal" signifying capacities believed 
to inhere in the means by which science and math register and trans-
mit information. The miracle of these capacities, for their adher-
4. For more on these three phenomena, see, respectively, Drosnin (1997, 
2002) , Smith (2000), and The Second Coming Project. 
5. This view finds its clearest expression in Drosnin's 1997 bestseller, The 
Bible Code, in which Drosnin-a skeptic won over to the idea that the Old Tes-
tament foretells significant events in human history-claims that we can certify 
the truth of the Bible Code today only because we have the technological means 
to do so. As Drosnin puts it, "The Bible is not only a book-it is also a computer 
program. It was first chiseled in stone and handwritten on a parchment scroll, 
finally printed as a book, waiting for us to catch up with it by inventing a com-
puter. Now it can be read as it was always intended to be read" (1997, p. 25) . We 
see it also in the discourse of The Second Coming Project, which claims that cer-
tain key events and lines in the New Testament-e.g. , the Last Supper, "In him 
we have redemption through his blood" (Ephesians 1:7)-have awaited the dis-
covery of cloning for their true meaning to be apprehended. 
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ents, rests precisely in the presumption that the ultimately mean-
ingful natural and/or theological truths and causes they discover 
remain uncontaminated by the means used to procure and com-
municate them. This is not just to repeat the maxim that every 
observer changes, in however small a way, what he/she observes; 
it is to say, instead, that structurally speaking, there is necessarily 
a non-sensical dimension-a point of opacity-in the Thing ob-
served that permits our observation of it in the first place. In other 
words, something about the Thing is not, and cart'not< be, entirely 
obvious. That so many recent scientific and mathematical attempts 
to break through and discover the very secrets of extratemporal 
knowledge rely explicitly on code is thus not surprising. As a meta-
language more accurate than our own, codes come to stand as a 
form of transcendent and meaningful writing written by the Other 
and existing independently of human cognition. That is to say, 
codes appear as a kind of metalanguage immune to the conditions 
or limitations that make a discourse possible.6 Today, DNA is in-
creasingly regarded as a kind of code containing the truth of our 
being-the very secret of lifeJ And computer codes are routinely 
6. These conditions, as I have been saying, involve the extent to which 
symbolization already entails the flight or cancellation of the real. One categori-
cal imperative of psychoanalysis is thus to insist that no discourse can claim to 
have intelligibly rendered or captured the real. As Bruce Fink puts it, "Psycho-
analysis' claim to fame does not reside in providing an archimedean point out-
side of discourse, but simply in elucidating the structure of discourse itself' (1995a, 
p. 137). 
7. For the genealogy of this phenomenon, see Kay (2000). Kay's (Foucauld-
ian) historicization of the rise of the genomic code-it is, she claims, a "'period 
piece,' a manifestation of the emergence of the information age" (p. 2)-captures 
beautifully the extent to which discoveries pertaining to the "elementary unit of 
life" become enmeshed in biological meaning-making efforts. From Kay's account, 
it is possible to see a kind of "stupidity" in molecular biology's construal of genes 
prior to the 1950s. Then, genes were seen simply as proteins bearing biochemi-
cal specificities. Prior to the '50s, when the idea of codes or information was in-
voked, it was almost exclusively as a metaphor, the words themselves appearing 
in quotation marks. But as molecular biology gets overrun by "the technoscientific 
imaginaries of the missile age," the discourse of information transforms the notion 
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credited for uncovering-at long last-meaningful signification in 
the real: only a computer, for instance, is capable of turning the 
original Bible into one continuous letter strand (304 ,805 letters 
long) in order to map every conceivable sequence of letters, and 
only a computer is able to encipher phrases into mathematical codes 
that can later be deciphered to confirm that a given communica-
tion received from the dead is in fact authentic and not one more 
instance of the deception that announces the symbolic order's 
imperfection. Indeed, today, codes appear more and more to so-
lidify the triumph (initiated by Bacon) of the truth claims of sci-
ence over those of theology-that is, its ability to explain transcen-
dence in material terms and thus absorb all metaphysical accounts 
of causality by referring them to the structural rigor of the scien-
tific method. 8 
of genes qua proteins into the notion of genes qua information, language, code, 
message, and text. The quotation marks disappear and the genomic code becomes 
itself an ontology, a veritable Book of Life whose unambiguous reading has awaited 
the material and theoretical tools of molecular biology. The problem with such 
an unambiguous reading is nothing less than the conceptual ground it clears for 
eugenics. If Kay's initial aim is to restore the fundamentally metaphorical nature 
of the genomic code-"The genetic code is not a code; it is, rather, a powerful 
metaphor for the correlations between nucleic and amino acids" (2000, p . ll)-
she does evince the characteristic poststructuralist unease with metaphor in toto . 
Thus her suggestion that those who attempt to use information theory in mo-
lecular biology in its intended form-to see, for example, the genomic code as a 
primordial signifier bearing information that must not be confused with mean-
ing-themselves introduce a totalizing discourse that risks arresting the polysemic 
nature of any putative "universal" or "absolute" instance of writing. For a simi-
lar genealogical critique of the way scientific explanations are the product of a 
given epistemological culture-that is, the way that explanations get to count as 
explanations only if they meet certain needs-see Keller (2002). 
8. Perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this involves recent neuroscientific 
research that explains religious experience-what Michael Persinger calls "the 
God Experience"-in terms of the evolution of neural networks, neurotransmit-
ters, and brain chemistry. Relying on the most advanced brain-imaging technol-
ogy, this research focuses on "brain function" during meditation, prayer, and ritual 
experiences in order to understand more completely the feeling of having com-
muned with a transcendent Being. For this thesis, see Persinger (1987) and 
Newberg and D'Aquili (1998) . The unstated assumption informing efforts such 
as these is that no phenomenon can ultimately escape the order of scientific laws. 
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At one level, the assertion of such codes at least has the ad-
vantage of arresting the endless play of substitutions characteris-
tic of a more metonymic, deconstructionist universe; at another, 
however, they raise the paranoid specter of a language that coin-
cides with-instead of sublating-what it illuminates. Far from 
replacing, canceling, or otherwise barring access to the Other in 
its lethal, indistinguishable-from-myself, flesh-and-blood dimen-
sion, these codes usher us into a seeming paradise of plenitude. 
But the coherent image of this imaginary p~r~dise is eJJ.tirely a psy-
chotic fantasy, since it emanates always from a symbolic position 
and functions as a way of compensating for the lack and inconsis-
tency that is part and parcel of that position. It is here that we can 
see the extent to which today, by failing to exempt primordial 
signifiers from our meaning-seeking efforts, we obstruct the 
signifier's crucial role in the institution of the symbolic order-that 
is, its overwriting of the imaginary, its calling a halt to jouissance. 
By failing to permit the exception around which a universe of 
meaning is constituted-the metaphorical substitute for the ulti-
mately lethal jouissance of the flesh and blood· Other (Mother, 
Nature, God)-we risk losing that critical place for ourselves as 
subjects to gain a foothold, a place secured only when a primor-
dial signifier comes to name and neutralize the potentially all-
engulfing lethal jouissance of the Other. The failure of this "essen-
tial metaphor"-the Name-of-the-Father, the natural Law-to take 
hold ends up then catalyzing a psychotic structure in which there 
is no lack admitted in the Other, in which the Other telegraphs its 
intentions not through the dead letter of the Name or formula 
but directly to the subject in the form of libidinally invested, 
prelapsarian primordial signifiers. 
As Fink puts it, "Causality in science is absorbed into what we might call struc-
ture-cause leading to effect within an ever more exhaustive set of laws. A cause 
as something that seems not to obey laws, remaining inexplicable from the stand-
point of scientific knowledge, has become unthinkable-our general tendency 
being to think that it will just be a matter of time before science can explain it" 
(l995b, p. 64). 
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The diagnostidconceptual dividing line between neurosis and 
psychosis lies here: if hysterics encounter a signifier whose mean-
ing remains enigmatic, psychotics never really encounter the sig 
nifier proper, since every use of signifiers is believed to bear sig-
nificant information. Indeed, as Lacan points out, what is most 
distinctive about the existence of the signifier-the possibility of 
it being used not to inform but to lure-is precisely what does not 
belong to the psychic economy of the psychotic. For the psychotic, 
every exchange of words is informational. Put another way, psy-
chotics fail to observe the Lacanian distinction between a signifier 
that signifies without being significant. In short, for the psychotic, 
every word is significant; no word merely signifies. Psychoanalysis, 
however, stakes our equilibrium on the non-sensical dimension of 
the pure signifier. As Lacan puts it, "to extract a natural law is to 
extract a meaningless formula. The less it signifies anything, the 
happier we are" (1993, p. 184).9 As a science, psychoanalysis al-
ready has as its target the psychotic structure that underwrites the 
fundamentally theological fantasy of the natural and social 
sciences-the notion that the deepest secrets of nature and society 
will, in the end, be shown to have had a meaningful ground all 
along. 
This fantasy is crystallized in an exemplary way in Darren 
Aronofsky's TT (1998) , a film that, in taking its viewer on the path 
from scientific pursuit to full-blown psychosis, ends up as a kind 
of object lesson in the etiology and symptomatology of psychosis 
for late capitalist culture at large. The achievement of Aronofsky's 
9. For Lacan, the space for interpretation depends on reducing the signifi-
cance of the signifier. This is why psychotics face no interpretive problems. Re-
fusing to concede the nonsense in signifiers, psychotics always find more and 
more meaning, and thus never really get to the question of subjectivity. Instead , 
psychotics remain wedded to the ego. As Marie-Helene Brousse points out, the 
nonsense in signifiers is what "allows you to impoverish the ego. Interpretation 
has to be enigmatic, that is, it has to produce less knowledge. By that, Lacan means, 
in the analytic setting, knowledge is to be taken as a test for knowledge and not 
as an application of knowledge" (1996, p. 126) . 
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film, however, does not extend simply to the accuracy of its por-
trayal of psychosis. This is because TT ends up-in the encounter it 
stages between viewer and film involving both a numerical signi-
fier (a 216-digit number believed to contain the key to the thorni-
est of social and cosmological enigmas) and a visual signifier (the 
image of its central character at the instant of performing a kind of 
self-lobotomy)-forcing a confrontation with that which cannot 
be made to mean. In the visions and numbers around which TT is 
structured, in other words, Aronofsky manages to ist>late the pri-
mordial signifier in its purely formal dimension. Thus at the end 
of Aronofsky's film, what we have discovered is a kind of imagistic 
equivalent of the primordial signifier, an antidote of sorts to the 
psychosis that the film depicts and the antithesis to the lion's share 
of commercial Hollywood films in which the central images are 
eventually inscribed within some intelligible and meaningful 
framework. 10 
The immediate context for Aronofsky's film is no doubt the 
historic, four-thousand year quest to fix the exact value of the most 
10. As representative of this trend, we might consider here M. Night 
Shyamalan, and the way his films are driven primarily by an inexplicable phe-
nomenon, a nonsensical image or phrase, that ends up being rendered intelli-
gible by film's end. The appeal of The Sixth Sense (1999), for example, lies in the 
basic mystery confronting child psychologist Malcolm Crowe (Bruce Willis)-a 
boy (Cole Sear, played by Haley joel Osment) with the capacity to "see dead 
people." The full meaning of this phrase is not revealed until we learn by the end 
that Crowe, himself, is one such dead individual. The narrative of Signs (2002) 
shares a similar logic. Arriving at the scene of a fatal car crash involving his wife, 
Father Graham Hess (Mel Gibson) is able to hear her final, seemingly nonsensi-
cal, words: "Swing away Merrill, swing away." The accident is responsible for 
Hess giving up both his faith and position in the church. At one point, Hess sees 
these lines-which refer to the brother-in-law who now lives with him after a 
failed professional baseball career-as simply the random firings of some nerve 
endings in his wife's brain. The film's climactic scene, however, in which the Hess 
family is confronted directly by a menacing alien, grants them a prescient dimen-
sion. That scene dismisses the existence of coincidence, of the free-floating sig-
nifier that has no anchor in the universe of meaning. In the end, this is what 
convinces Hess to become "Father Hess" again. 
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famous of irrational numbers (7T) 11-a quest whose current mani-
festation has mandated the building of ever more elaborate com-
puters capable of calculating the ratio of a circle's circumference 
to its diameter out to billions of digits (the current record is 51 
billion). This quest to "square the circle" has almost always been a 
theological one. What has attracted so many to figuring out the 
value of 7T has not simply been the complexity of its endless divis-
ibility but rather why it should unfold in such a complex manner. 12 
11. The discovery of irrational numbers-that is, numbers that cannot be 
identified completely, since they have no patterns that repeat and thus require 
an infinite number of decimals to be written exactly-constitutes one of the de-
cisive paradigm shifts in mathematics away from algebra and toward geometri-
caVmathematical analysis. It is their discovery that is responsible for dealing the 
death blow to the (Pythagorean) notion that "God is number," that the perfec-
tion of God rests in the fact that the relationship between magnitudes could be 
represented with integers and their ratios. Irrational numbers give, as it were, a 
Kantian turn to the mathematical screw, since they base mathematical analysis 
not on the perfect truth and logic of rational numbers (i.e., numbers that are either 
"whole" or that can be written with decimals that eventually become zero or that 
have a pattern that repeats itself indefinitely) , but on the notion of geometrical 
demonstration and a continuum leading to infinity whose terminus cannot be 
reached. For an overview of this paradigm shift, see Aczel (2000, pp. ll-24) . Kant, 
himself, credits geometry with ushering in a revolution "much more important 
than the discovery of the passage around the celebrated Cape": because geom-
etry recognizes a kind of opacity/irrationality in numbers, it ends up dealing not 
with what numbers and the properties of figures are, in themselves, a priori. In-
stead, what geometry elucidates is that numbers and the properties of figures are 
brought out by an act of the subject-that is, "by virtue of what [the mathema-
tician) himself was, according to concepts, thinking into it a priori and exhibit-
ing" (1996, pp. 17-18). 
12. For an overview of the history informed by this notion, see Blatner 
(1997). Blatner notes that no measurement realistically requires even 100 digits 
of pi-engineers routinely use no more than seven and physicists use no more 
than fifteen or twenty. For him, the search for pi is "deeply rooted in the human 
spirit of exploration-of both our minds and our world-and in our irrepress-
ible drive to test our limits" (p. 3). As Blatner sees it , rr separates the line be-
tween the finite and the infinite and thus represents a mystery to be appreciated. 
Behind this appreciation, however, appears to be a deferral of the (Hegelian) recog-
nition that every pull up in the face of the infinite is in fact the infinite. The com-
putation and writing of the decimals-Blatner's own book contains one million 
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For Max Cohen (Sean Gullette), the brilliant mathematician at the 
center of Aronofsky's film, the advances and insights into math-
ematical knowledge likewise have little to do with utility. As Max 
asserts in one of the film's initial voice-overs, mathematics is the 
very language of Nature. Everything around us can be represented 
and understood through numbers, he claims, and these numbers, 
if graphed, will reveal the emergence of meaningful patterns. Max's 
voice-over here culminates with his sitting in a park in New York 
City's Chinatown, staring at the leaves at the top "fa-tall tree, with 
shots from Max's point of view that zoom in on these leaves sug-
gesting a kind of superior, penetrating sight on Max's part. (The 
reverse shots likewise zoom in on Max's face, suggesting an un-
canny intelligence in Nature itself.) As we might expect, this deep-
seated belief that nothing in Nature eludes our sense-making ca-
pacities has its origins in Max's boyhood, where the institution of 
the primordial signifier in the form of a fundamental prohibition 
never took hold. This is made clear in the film's initial voice-over 
in which Max gives us our lone insight into his childhood: as a boy, 
he disregarded his mother's prohibition not to stare at the sun, and 
the experience resulted in the temporary bandaging of his eyes, in 
recurrent headaches, and in the feeling (as Max puts it) that "some-
thing had changed inside me." 
Far from functioning as a lesson on the necessity of symbolic 
interdictions, this experience is described instead in words Icarus 
might have used (the film will later invoke the Daedalus-Icarus 
motif)-as a kind of triumphant refusal to accept any effective pro-
hibition. For Max, this refusal amounts to an instance of fortitude 
that provides direct access to the deepest sources of the Other's (in 
this case, Nature's) secrets, delivering in the process a moment of 
of the digits-might be a way to evade an encounter with the symbolic icon IT, 
and the fact that it keeps on signifying. From the standpoint of physics, the same 
is true for the crucial element hydrogen. As john Rigden suggests in the epilogue 
to his "biography of hydrogen," the continued existence of science is linked to 
the fact that "the hydrogen atom still beckons," on the fact that there is some-
thing about this "essential element" that remains opaque (2002, p . 255). 
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pure understanding. 13 Convinced of the existence of patterns ev-
erywhere in nature-in disease epidemics, in the wax and wane of 
caribou population, in sunspot cycles, in the rise and fall of the 
Nile-Max has now centered his attention on the stock market, 
believing that it, too, must evince a meaningful pattern capable of 
being known. Indeed, this is for him, in some sense, the sole sig-
nificance of the stock market: just like the movement of the leaves 
of a tree, it is an entity that is signifying, and Max is committed to 
discovering the "intelligence" behind it.14 For him, the stock mar-
ket stands not as the exemplary signifier without signified of late 
13. This sense of triumph emerges in Max's second voice-over dealing with 
the disregarded prohibition: "When I was a little kid, my mother told me not to 
stare into the sun. So once, when I was six, I did. At first , the brightness was 
overwhelming, but I had seen that before. I kept looking, forcing myself not to 
blink. And then the brightness began to dissolve. My pupils shrank to pinholes 
and everything came into focus . And for a moment, I understood. " 
14. One sign of Max's psychosis here is that he is not at all concerned with 
symbolic recognition or material advantage. This is patently clear in his rejec-
tion of the Wall Street firm Lancet-Percy (i.e., the "petty materialists"), which 
wants access to Euclid's predictive abilities. On the contrary, Max wants perfec-
tion-the jouissance of the Other in an unmediated form. Aronofsky extends this 
insight into psychosis in his second film, Requiem for a Dream (2001). At first 
glance, it might appear that Aronofsky has pursued a different path, since the 
thing that catalyzes the plot is his protagonists' attempt to secure the recogni-
tion of the Big Other: Sara Goldfarb (Ellen Burstyn) wants to appear on televi-
sion in her red dress and thus regain the recognition she imagines she once 
enjoyed; her son Harry Goldfarb Oared Leto) and his girlfriend Marion Silver (Jen-
nifer Connelly) aim to open up a dress shop; and Harry's friend, Tyrone C. Love 
(Marlon Wayans), is shown more than once speaking to a picture of his dead 
mother about his pursuit of money and security. But as Requiem dramatizes the 
quest to realize the "dream" of societal validation, it ends up showing that the 
(horrific) appeal of a pre-symbolic jouissance is too great. This explains the great 
pull of the addictions that lead to the ruination of the four (captured , in the film's 
climax, by the way Aronofsky depicts a kind of horribly triumphant orality: Sara 
has a rubber appliance put into her mouth during her electroshock treatment; 
Marion has a dollar bill shoved into her mouth while being forced to "perform" 
at the party; Harry's mouth is covered by an oxygen mask) . The end of the film 
reveals that the other "dream" in the film-centered on Harry and Marion's love 
for each other (at one point, Harry says to Marion that she is his "dream")-is 
likewise no match for the lethal jouissance of the Other. 
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capitalist social relations; on the contrary, he sees it as "a universe 
of numbers that represents the global economy. Millions of human 
hands at work . .. billions of minds . . . a vast network screaming 
with life. An organism. A natural organism." His hypothesis is that 
deep within the stock market, "there is a pattern as well. Right in 
front of me. Hiding behind the numbers. Always has been." In the 
attempt to make plain what has been hidden, Max's life (and entire 
apartment) is devoted to Euclid-a monstrous, homemade assem-
blage of monitors, hard drives, modems, ~nd cables that Max has 
retrieved from an electronic mega dump, that exceeds in power and 
speed the entire Columbia University computer science department 
and that is on the verge of being able to predict with 100 percent 
accuracy the daily vicissitudes of the market. At the onset of the film, 
Max is "so close" to achieving this accuracy, and he spends his days 
working to inoculate Euclid against anomalies he chalks up to 
human error, and checking The Wall Street journal against the data 
Euclid is able to produce. 
At the coffee shop where he compares stock quotes, however, 
Max makes the acquaintance of Lenny Meyer (Ben Shenkman), an 
orthodox Jew who, upon learning Max's name, reminds him of his 
Jewish identity, mentioning Kabbalah and the fact that it is now a 
"critical moment" in the history of]udaism. Lenny asks Max if he's 
ever put on tefillin-the small cube-shaped boxes worn on the 
forehead and arm, containing the four textual sources (from the 
Bible) for the practice. Two of these sources come from Exodus 
and concern the duty for each Jew to commemorate God's deliver-
ance of the Jews, to acknowledge a God for whom such deliver-
ance begets certain responsibilities and obligations. The other two 
come from Deuteronomy and concern Judaism's basic prayer, the 
Shema, which begins by acknowledging the singularity of God 
("Hear 0 Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One") and then 
proceeds to lay out a detailed description of the rewards and pun-
ishments that might follow from obeying (or not) His laws. For 
Lenny, tefillin have "a tremendous amount of power" and put-
ting them on is a "mitzvah for allJewish men to do"-a good deed 
that "purif[ies] us and bring[s] us close to God. " The tefillin may 
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"look strange" (at these very words of Lenny's, Aronofsky cuts to 
a close-up of this object), but the place of the small box in daily 
Jewish worship is clearly intended to recall the symbolic pact made 
between God and the Jews-a pact rooted in filial recognition of 
the paternal Law, as well as the several substitute satisfactions God 
offers in the form of speech, writing, ritual prayer, and obedience. 
Conceptually, tefillin introduce both the conditional freedom that 
constitutes the theme of Exodus and the Jews' deliverance from 
slavery in Exodus, as well as the injunction to love and follow the 
entire codified set of good deeds designed to secure the approval 
of God. The practice of putting on tefillin involves the realization 
of this conceptual dimension. The knots and straps placed on head 
and arm involve, as it were, a symbolic performance of self-binding, 
a constraining of one's intellectual and bodily prowess. In this light, 
it is not hard to see why the very mention and sight of tefillin con-
stitute the threat to Max that they do. As a reminder of a funda-
mental obligation, it presents to Max the place of the Law where 
there is no signifier, the edge of a hole, and thus triggers in Max 
the first of a series of psychotic breaks in which Aronofsky ushers 
his viewer entirely into the domain of the imaginary, besieging us 
with a rapidly cut chaos of perceptions, sensations, visual images, 
and auditory impressions. His thumb twitching, his head invaded 
by sounds he can't control, Max returns to his apartment where he 
hallucinates the existence of an "Intruder" pounding on his door, 
unlocking its several bolts, and finally breaking its chains-at which 
point he becomes unmoored from the social world altogether, and 
the film's field of representation is entirely taken over by what 
Aronofsky has termed "the blinding white void. " 15 One of the 
achievements of TT lies here, in its depiction of the paradoxical and 
harrowing nature of the fully fledged psychotic break, in which the 
15. Strictly speaking, this is the second such breakdown, since the last frame 
of the opening credits-not coincidentally, the picture of a whitened sun against 
a black background-is engulfed by the blinding white void that dissolves even-
tually into the opening image of the film: an extreme close-up of Max's face, his 
nose bleeding, his cheek to the floor as he comes to. 
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subject is completely engulfed by the jouissance of the Other. For 
Max, God is not yet an entity one must attempt to satisfy-and 
thereby ward off-by the repeated performance of ritual; on the 
contrary, He is an entity to be known, a source of perfection that 
can help us understand (and thereby gain mastery over) our world. 
But as the film clearly demonstrates, the knowledge and perfection 
he seeks at the same time threaten the very ontological consistency 
of Max's universe, which explains his injunctions (on the cusp of 
the break) for the "Intruder" to "leave me alone." Refusing to ac-
cede to the act of exchange that marks the very founding of Juda-
ism (and of any symbolic order)-the dividing up and distribut-
ing of jouissance-Aronofsky thus depicts Max being made to bear 
God's return in the real. And what that return entails is not the 
harmonious symbiosis with the Other that the psychotic imagines. 
After regaining consciousness, Max symptomatically interprets 
his problem as an organic one whose remedy rests with neuro-
science and pharmacology. 16 Soon, Euclid accurately predicts a 
series of stock quotes-in the process spitting out a 216-digit 
number at the very instant that it crashes-and Aronofsky's film 
arrives at the primordial signifier whose meaning the psychotic is 
desperate to literalizeY The notion that this signifier bears a lit-
eral meaning-that there is something to be seen behind or beneath 
16. The list of Max's "failed treatments" (given to us in a voice-over) is a 
long one: beta-blockers, calcium channel blockers, adrenalin injections, high-dose 
ibuprofen, steroids, trager metasitics, violent exercise, Cafergot suppositories, 
caffeine, acupuncture, marijuana, Percodan, Midrin, Tenormin, Sansert, homeo-
pathies. He also consults some sort of medical textbook, hoping to localize that 
section of the brain that might be responsible for his "headaches." Needless to 
say, all of these measures treat the problem as organidphysiological. 
17. It is interesting to note that when Max takes apart his computer to 
discover the cause for the crash, he finds the remains of an ant that has left some 
sort of ooze on the circuit boards, shorting them out. This ooze cannot be sili-
con, given silicon's melting point of 1414 degrees Celsius (2577 degrees Fahren-
heit)-a feature that makes it so suitable for circuit boards. At any rate, this or-
ganic discovery of what in fact interfered with his computer's ability to run 
correctly becomes, in Max's hands, a profound source of inspiration. In this scene, 
and the one following it, I think we can see Aronofsky playing off the motif at 
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the number-is only enhanced by Max's discoveries following 
Euclid's crash: first, that his mentor Sol Robeson's (Mark Margolis) 
investigations into the number TT crashed into a 216-digit number 
as well and second, that Lenny Meyer's group of Hasidic Jews (led 
by Rav Cohen [Stephen Pearlman]) believes the same number to 
be the true name of God whose intonation would reverse the Roman 
destruction of the Second Temple and thus restore the High Priests 
of]udaism (the Kohanim) to their place at the center of that Temple 
and, ultimately, return the world to the Garden of Eden. 18 
In the case of the latter, we see perhaps most explicitly the 
extent to which the vivification of God is linked to the meaning 
believed to reside in the father's name. Citing the Talmud, Rav 
Cohen instructs Max that the entire priesthood, all of the Kohanim 
(the Cohens), were destroyed by the Romans at the destruction of 
the Second Temple. In this way, their "greatest secret" was de-
stroyed, and along with it, any real ground capable of guarantee-
ing the integrity of their name. Bereft of the Temple, there is no 
longer a place for the crucial "single ritual" that the holiest of 
priests-the "High Cohen"-must perform. According to Rav Cohen, 
on the Day of Atonement, all of Israel would descend upon Jerusa-
lem to witness this priest's trip into the "earthly residence of God" 
at the center of the great Temple for the purpose of intoning His 
true name. If the priest was pure, he would emerge a few moments 
later and Israel's security and prosperity would be secured for the 
coming year. In this account of Rav Cohen's, we have here not just 
an effort to bring Max back within the fold of Judaism-to make 
him a "Cohen"-but all the ingredients for the formation of a group 
the heart of the story of Archimedes, a figure whom Max's mentor, Sol, actually 
invokes later in the film. I thank Edward Fowble for helping me to read these 
scenes of the film. 
18. Each letter in the Hebrew alphabet carries a numerical value, a fact that 
has led some to impute a superior intelligence to this particular language alone. 
We see this in Lenny's initial attempts to interest Max in the Torah and Kabbalah, 
showing him, for example, how the numerical value of the Hebrew word for 
mother ( 41) added to the numerical value of the Hebrew word for father (3) is 
equal to the numerical value of the Hebrew word for child (44) . 
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of believers: a group ratifies its privileged plate in God's gaze 
through a ritualized performance rooted in an utterance permit-
ted to only one man in one restricted space. It is perhaps here that 
the trauma of the destruction of the Temple comes through most 
clearly, that a direct line from that destruction to our contempo-
rary psychotic universe emerges. Indeed, might we see the circum-
scribed space of the Temple not merely as a sign of its holiness, 
but rather as the place that veils the stupidity of the signifier, as 
the place where a purely formal , performative, "magical" self-
legitimizing gesture takes place? The trauma of the <iestruction of 
the Temple, then, resides not in the loss of the true name of God, 
but rather in the Wizard of Oz-like drawing back of the curtain on 
those founding signifiers that gain their force purely from their own 
enunciation. Bereft of this space, Rav Cohen cannot position him-
self as a symbolic father, electing instead to take up the role of 
Urvater and hoping Max is interested in protection from God's 
jouissance. But as Paul Verhaeghe has observed, in the wake of the 
loss of symbolic paternal authority, "primal fathers are popping up 
everywhere, on the lookout for their ownjouissance" (2000, p. 139). 
We might see Max, himself, as such a father. This would explain 
why he will not for an instant entertain the possibility of letting a 
Cohen "higher" than himself intone the word. 
Aronofsky has already prepared us, however, for the fact that 
an intoning of the word is likely neither to recover a foundation 
that is beyond or beneath its own utterance, nor to become the 
meaningful basis for group identity. As Max's psychotic breaks have 
already made plain, there is only a kind of nothingness-a blind-
ing white void-beyond or beneath the primordial signifier. And 
though the parties seeking possession of the 216-digit number 
imagine it as a conduit for stability and understanding and an ex-
alted sense of community, Aronofsky's film stages precisely the 
opposite outcome. This is its central importance as a film;· rather 
than consent to the "lie" that cements a given social order-the 
belief that Max is, in fact, a "high priest" of sorts, the bearer of 
knowledge that they want to know nothing about-the parties 
seeking possession of the number evince themselves the symptoms 
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of their investment in a psychotic fantasy. Thus, the meaning of 
the number becomes necessarily an exclusive one. Max believes, for 
instance, that God has chosen to place the number in his head alone; 
Marcy Dawson of the Wall Street firm Lancet-Percy believes that 
the number is fair game for them because information is ipso facto 
the language of capital and competition the law of nature; and Rav 
Cohen claims that Max is merely the "vessel" for a delivery meant 
for them. It is no accident that all three parties act violently toward 
each other. Here, Aronofsky gets at the implicit psychotic link 
between capitalist competition and religious fundamentalism: both 
seek the secret they imagine would secure their supremacy, even 
as Marcy Dawson speaks of the "symbiotic relationship" her firm 
is trying to forge with Max, and Rav Cohen instructs Max in the 
link between the number and an impending Messianic Age. 
This link is made formally explicit both in the ways we are 
made to see the cube-shaped Ming Mecca chip provided to Max by 
Lancet-Percy as well as the way it functions as an object in the film. 
This not-yet-declassified chip is introduced as the key to Euclid's 
recovery and triumph, and Aronofsky situates and shoots it in such 
a way as to make its parallel to a tefillin box unmistakable. We first 
see the Ming Mecca chip in a closeup that mirrors the closeup of 
the tefillin Lenny first showed Max, and as with the tefillin, the 
sight of the chip triggers somatic reactions (e.g., thumb twitches) 
that betoken another invasion into Max's head by an Intruder. The 
second time we see the chip comes in a medium shot of Max in-
stalling it into his mainframe-a shot that frames Max's installa-
tion as a kind of monstrous parody of the act of putting the tefillin 
around his head. Finally, when Max does get the chip installed, it 
triggers a "meltdown" in which Max's rapid circling of the camera 
recalls the earlier circling shot to which Aronofsky cuts when Lenny 
does get Max to put on tefillin and the two of them begin to recite 
the Shema; both evoke an anxious and frenetic encircling of the 
void. 
But the accuracy of rr's depiction of rampant cultural psycho-
sis is part of a more generalized portrait of the way individuals 
encounter alterity in a society bereft of the primordial signifier, 
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where there is nothing to shield us from constantly being enjoyed 
by others. Almost all of the (little o) others Max encounters in the 
film are seen as adversarial, invasive, and violent-the bearers of a 
menacingjouissance. Aronofsky captures this cinematically in sev-
eral ways. First, he films Max in public spaces in ways that make 
what Max sees almost always threatening-capable of being looked 
at in only the quickest of glances. In these spaces, a hideous sense 
of enjoyment seems to pervade even the most ordinary of gestures 
(e.g., a man eating a sandwich on a street corner, a man reading 
the newspaper on the subway, etc.). Even ·Max's M.llucinations 
betoken an overproximate Other whose exclusive gaze he cannot 
escape (e.g., the elderly man Max "sees" in the subway who breaks 
out into song: "Are the stars out tonight?/ I don't know if they're 
cloudy or bright/ For I only have eyes for you, dear"). It is pre-
cisely this Other whose most notable feature is its overproximity 
that demands a kind of speed and vigilance on Max's part when-
ever he is in these spaces (e.g., in the subway, in the bodega, walk-
ing on the streets of Chinatown, etc.) .19 To capture this speed-
and accompanying sense of disorientation-Aronofsky almost always 
reduces the frame rate in Max's point-of-view shots, thus revealing 
the increasingly hyperaccelerated world that Max imagines out-
side the confines of his or Sol's apartment. In addition, he often shoots 
the reverse tracking shots of Max with a Snorricam, a camera attached 
to Max's body that results in the frame's tilting with each frenetic 
step Max takes. A lens of shorter focal length also works to distort 
both Max's face and the spatial relationships between him and the 
urban world. Besides reflecting the overproximity of the Other, which 
is a distinguishing feature of the psychotic universe, these moves 
work, at times, to "imaginarize" the theater itself-that is, to threaten 
the implicit contract that governs the theatergoing experience. That 
19. The lone exception is the place depicted as outside the circuits of capi-
tal and hypertechnologization-Coney Island. There, Aronofsky increases the 
frame rate to slow down Max's experience of the world, and includes the sight of 
"King Neptune," a man dressed almost like a clown, trolling the beach with a 
metal detector, who puts back the seashell he has picked up and admired. 
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is to say, besides merely depicting the chaos of Max's world, the 
instability of the camera and inconsistency of the frame risk bring-
ing us face to face with that side of the imaginary that borders on 
the real. It is this side of the imaginary-and not the one that bor-
ders on the symbolic, which reduces the imaginary entirely to the 
domain of specular images of wholeness-that marks the latter 
imaginary's point of failure, the point at which it breaks into pieces. 
Thus we might clarify the Lacanian dimension of the counter-
ideological thrust of Aronofsky's film by saying that rather than 
eschew the imaginary altogether as ipso facto ideological, 1Tattempts 
to break its privileged link to the symbolic so as to illuminate the 
terror of its real, presymbolic status. In other words, the imaginary 
depicted in 1T is not the version of it with which we are usually 
presented-that is, a realistic presentation of reality that produces 
a subject/spectator completely in control of what he/she is seeing. 20 
Rather than realistic, coherent mirror images offered up for our 
easy identification, rather than a fantasized compatibility between 
jouissance and symbolization, Aronofsky gives us instead images 
of jouissance that overwhelm the coherence of the film. In so doing, 
Aronofsky's film helps us to glimpse the imaginary bereft of the 
fantasy frame that makes it seem so appealing, even if this means 
bringing Max's world too close to us and making the film, in places, 
difficult to endure. 
This sense of suffocating overproximity is rendered cinemati-
cally in two other significant ways. The first centers around the 
20. This is, as the editors point out in their introduction to this volume, 
the way Lacanian psychoanalysis has frequently been deployed in film studies-
as a way of showing how film's very presentation of reality secures a spectator/ 
subject in the manner of the mirror stage. In this view, film presents imaginary 
scenarios that are always already fantasized versions of the imaginary-that is to 
say, versions of the imaginary in which the spectator/subject will precisely not 
experience him-/herself in pieces. Thus Stephen Heath's claim that film works 
largely by regulating a movement toward disintegration and/or contradiction in 
the spectator/subject. According to Heath , "Film is the regulation of that move-
ment, the individual as subject held in a shifting and placing of desire, energy, 
contradiction, in a perpetual retotalization of the imaginary" (1981 , p. 53) . 
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recurrent hallucination that precedes Max's psychotic breaks in-
volving the sight of a Hasidic jew whose mere presence on the other 
side of the subway line Max takes as a threat, and whose hand is 
dripping blood, the trail of which leads to Max's own brain. This 
image suggests both the extent to which castrating agents appear 
to Max in the real, and his investment in a certain neuroscientific 
fantasy that likewise literalizes the ur-language of the Other, in 
which a certain segment of Max's brain is taken as the locus of 
causality for the onslaught of sensory and auditory impressions to 
which he is subjected. That Max prods, afid ends up penetrating, 
the brain with a fountain pen before being ushered into the blind-
ing white void is perhaps apt, since the jouissance of the Other is 
precisely what marks out the limits of discourse. The second in-
volves the way Aronofsky signals the impossibility of any sexual 
relationship for Max. This is clearest in the way that for Max, any 
woman who evinces the slightest trace of sexual desire betokens 
the presence of a maternal being who is at the same time obscenely 
and atavistically sexual. His neighbor Devi's attempts to "mother" 
Max (she prepares food for him, fixes his hair before he goes out, 
worries about his welfare, etc.) are part of her obvious desire for 
him; for Max, however, there is no difference between being de-
sired and being enjoyed, no distance that would allow him to exist 
before Devi's gaze without being suffocated by her jouissance. 
Aronofsky twice has Max on the cusp of arriving at the 216-digit 
number at precisely the same instant that Devi and her boyfriend, 
Farouk, are engaged in sex. The acoustic dimension of these sexual 
encounters sends Max into a virtual panic in which the camera 
rapidly circles him. 21 
21. Aronofsky has intentionally muffled Devi's sounds here, which only 
heightens the sense that he has restaged a primal scene of sorts. After several lis-
tens-and thanks to the sound quality of DVD technology-it is possible finally 
to discern the sense of Devi's utterances amidst her ecstatic moans: "Do you want 
to suck on Mama's nipple? I Oh, those tears are so hard./ Mama's going to make 
everything all right." 
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That a closeup of Max's finger on the "Return" button of his com-
puter-poised to trigger the computer's revealing of the 216-digit 
number-generally accompanies the onset of the all-engulfing 
sounds of enjoyment signals the extent to which the primordial 
signifier might function for Max. Rather than allowing it to pro-
vide some respite from enjoyment, Max, as we have already seen, 
insists on trying to discover why the number enjoys in the way that 
it does. An articulation of the perils of this attempt to render the 
signifier back up into the order of understandable causality is left 
both to Euclid and to Sol. Euclid's own demise contains a message 
Max can't heed. Becoming aware of its own structure, Euclid must 
emit a kind of protoplasmic "little piece of the real," the gooey life-
substance of an ant that is made to stand in for Euclid's own unsym-
bolizable origins. This is precisely Sol's lesson to Max. In the face 
of the psychotic's certainty regarding the meaningful intelligence 
of the Other's jouissance-Max's belief that "there is an answer in 
that number"-Sol keeps insisting that the truth of our universe is 
that there is no meaningful pattern prior to the institution of a 
symbolic network of meanings in which a universe appears. For 
Sol, the only pattern is the self-referential one we impose on it, 
which is why he refuses to allow the number to signify anything, 
contending variously that the number is a "dead-end," a "door in 
front of a cliff," a "bug"-all astute ways of characterizing the func-
tion of the paternal metaphor in the formation of the symbolic 
order. Here, Sol is closest to the psychoanalytic recognition that 
the signifier does exist in nature and that it enables us to gain our 
bearings on the world, but what it signifies is entirely another 
matter. Playing Daedalus to his "renegade pupil" Icarus, Sol tries 
to reassert a prohibition, warning Max of the dangers of numerol-
ogy and urging him to leave the digit "unknown." 
The precise function of this advice is left ambiguous in 
Aronofsky's film, since there is evidence that Sol's death-from a 
second stroke-follows on the heels of a failure to heed his own 
advice. At the death scene, Max finds the number written out in 
Sol's handwriting on a sheet of paper, and this may just signal the 
extent to which Sol's voiced prohibition functioned covertly as a 
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way of keeping alive whatever meaning the 216-digit number might 
bear. In any case, Aronofsky finally leaves it to Max to grasp the 
stupidity of the number and thus to realize the impossible object 
at the heart of the psychotic structure. Up until Sol's death, Max 
has been committed to "seeing the number," claiming that the 
number itself is nothing, that it is what's "between the numbers" 
that is important. Back in his apartment after learning of his 
mentor's death, Max begins to intone the number (the true name 
of God) and is cast again into the blinding white "VOid.. This time, 
however, his own image appears in the void, and there is a sense 
that he has begun to hear the other speaking within himself as the 
bearer of the primordial signifier. This leads directly to the film's 
final two images-the first of Max, with a drill in his hand on the 
verge of committing a kind of self-lobotomy; the second of Max, 
in the park enjoying the factum brutum of Nature, no longer posi-
tioning himself as the bearer of a question to which he must have 
the answer. At first glance, the first of these images in which we 
see the drill penetrate Max's skull, splattering the frame with blood 
before cutting to black, would seem to invite a reading of 7Tin keep-
ing with the prevailing neuroscientific control of psychiatry. On 
this reading, Max's cure appears to be simple: it is not enough that 
he burns the number, since it remains in his head. Thus, what's 
called for is an identification and localization of the area of the brain 
responsible for the ideational content associated with the number, 
the excision of which lets him achieve a degree of equilibrium. But 
that this could actually work as a self-administered procedure 
strains credulity. Also , since Max appears in the final scene with a 
black ski hat covering his head, the status of his scalp/brain is left 
purposely veiled. 
Perhaps the surest sign that things are far more complicated 
than the materialist-realist explanation is the question Aronofsky 
has admitted is the one he is most frequently asked: How was the 
self-lobotomy sequence filmed? In the light of this question, we 
might say here that this image ends up functioning as the film's 
own primordial signifier-a vision homologous with the number 
at the heart of the film and likewise incapable of being made mean-
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ingful. That Aronofsky has confessed that this was the image around 
which he structured the film-that "writing movies is like reverse 
paranoia"-only furthers the sense that TT leads us to the recogni-
tion of the purely signifying function of primordial signifiers. 22 Rather 
than make this image signify something meaningful, Aronofsky 
appears to grant it a purely structural function. As such, the image 
functions to "call a halt to jouissance" and, at the same time, to 
remain a site of non-knowledge that is our bulwark against a fully 
fledged psychotic universe. The sequence that presents us with the 
image of Max Cohen with a drill at his skull, then, consists of a 
physical gesture whose stupidity depends on Max's (and our) sub-
jectivization. In the scene that follows, this formal instance of sig-
nification has itself become the content. The scene begins with 
an extreme closeup of the leaves on the tree of the city park in which 
Max is sitting, followed by a reverse medium shot of Max staring 
at the tree. Max is then approached by Jenna (the little girl who 
lives in a neighboring apartment) to calculate in his head the sum 
of two hundred and fifty-five multiplied by one hundred and eighty-
three. For a moment, Max tries to perform the calculation, then 
stops and begins smiling, allowing the little girl to do it on her 
calculator. This decision in favor of non-knowledge is captured 
cinematically as well in the frames with which the film closes-
reverse zoom point-of-view shots that complete the arc established 
in the film's opening in which Max gains some much-needed dis-
tance from Nature. Shot at the normal frame rate, Max gazes at 
leaves blowing in the wind in a way that no longer regards them as 
the bearer of a hidden and/or sinister pattern or meaning. 
The final import of TT here would seem to be that we, too , in 
the attempt to counter rampant psychosis, must cast our lot as well 
22. In his earliest diary entry related to rr, Aronofsky writes of the lone script 
of his that would be suitable for a low-budget film: "The working title is 'Chip in 
the Head.' Along with the title I have a single image of Sean Gullette, my actor 
friend from college, standing in front of the mirror, his head shaved bald, dig-
ging into his skull with an X-Acto blade for an implant he thinks is in there" 
(1998, pp. 3-4). 
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with non-knowledge, with something encountered and perceived 
for which we cannot find a meaningful antecedent. This exemplar 
of non-knowledge functions to arrest the chain of signification, but 
it is something of which we cannot make total sense. Has Max re-
ally lobotomized himself by film's end? What does the hat covering 
his head really conceal? Is he merely stupid, or has he subjectivized 
the stupidity of the primordial signifier at the heart of the film in 
which he appears? My own contention is that in these scenes, we 
are presented not with the void behind or..beneath language, but 
precisely with the signifier as such. In his seminar on ethics, Lacan 
claims that "the Thing only presents itself to the extent that it be-
comes word" and that the word in whose guise it presents itself is 
"what remains silent; it is precisely that in response to which no 
words are spoken" (1992, p. 55). So, perhaps we need say nothing 
about the end of Aronofsky's film except to say that we can say 
nothing more. Perhaps the finale of the film enacts itself a kind of 
antidote for the psychosis that it has dramatized-an antidote ap-
pearing imagistically as the functional equivalent of the Word for 
which, today, we must struggle in order to call a halt to jouissance. 
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2 
The Anxiety of Love Letters 
RENATA SALECL 
- ... 
On the Internet, one can find numerous sites where people can 
obtain advice on how to write a love letter. One site, for example, 
gives the following instructions: 
Clear your desk and your mind of distractions. 
Place a picture of the one you love in front of you. 
Put on your favorite music. 
Take out your best stationery and pen. 
On another sheet of paper, make two lists: a) his/her unique 
qualities; b) your hopes for the future together. 
Personalize the salutation. "Dear---," or "To my darling 
---,"are both fine. 
In the body of the letter, begin by telling him/her what you think 
makes the individual so special. List at least three 
qualities, ideally emotional, physical, and spiritual ones. 
In the following paragraph, share your hopes and dreams for 
the future you can have together. 
Personalize the closing. "I will love you always," "Loving you 
forever," "My heart is yours," are all good possibilities. 
